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STROUD’S QUEST FOR REALITY
BILL BREWER
Barry Stroud begins his investigation into the metaphysics of colour with a discussion of
the elusiveness of the genuinely philosophical quest for reality. He insists upon a
distinction between two ways in which the idea of a correspondence between perceptions
or beliefs and the facts may be understood: first, as equivalent to the plain truth of the
perceptions/beliefs in question; second, as conveying the metaphysical reality of the
corresponding features of the world. I begin by voicing some suspicion about this
distinction. Then I go on to consider various aspects of his central argument against the
likelihood of any successful unmasking explanation in connection with colour. The final
moves of this argument seem to me to be unstable. Either his conclusion that the
unmasker’s overall strategy is self-defeating is stronger than is warranted, or his
insistence that no conclusive result is established in connection with the fundamental
quest for reality is unduly cautious, depending on how precisely the dependence, which
he rightly insists upon, of the identification of perceptions of colour upon some
identification of colour properties themselves, is to be taken.
There is an everyday sense in which beliefs and perceptions may critically be
assessed. I measure my desk to check whether it is really 80 cm wide as I believe; and I
take a shirt out of artificial lighting to confirm whether it is really the shade of blue which
it appears. Certainly the metaphysical issue concerning the reality of colours is not to be2
decided in the same way; but Stroud’s claim is stronger. He thinks that that issue
concerns a quite different notion of correspondence, not to be equated with the plain truth
of beliefs and perceptions as this is involved in such everyday cases. As he says,
the philosophical project cannot be understood as the straightforward
investigation of how things are. It does not ask simply which of our beliefs are
true or worthy of acceptance. To find in the special philosophical way that there is
nothing in reality corresponding to a particular belief is not simply to find the
belief false or epistemically wanting… the philosophical project aims to reveal a
different kind of deficiency or lack of correspondence in a belief. (p. 20, my
emphasis)
Call the proponent of the view that colours are in the relevant sense
metaphysically real, the realist about colours; call her opponent the anti-realist. Stroud’s
claim is not in line with my understanding of the orthodox anti-realist position, on which
colour perceptions present things in the world as being certain ways which they are not.
Thus, colour appearances are all plain false, as is every belief that anything in the world
is the way which any colour experience presents it as being. So the deficiency, or lack of
correspondence, concerned is nothing other than literal falsity.
It is compatible with this anti-realism to give an account of beliefs expressed
using colour words on which many of these are nevertheless true. The idea would be that
their truth-conditions require, not that objects should be the ways they are presented as
being by colour experiences - none of them ever are - but that they should have, either the
disposition to produce those experiences in ‘normal observers’ in ‘normal conditions’, or3
whatever physical constitution actually grounds that disposition. Perceptual and belief
contents may then be aligned by regarding colour experiences, not as intrinsically
presentational of worldly properties, but as blank sensations, extrinsically endowed with
representational powers in virtue of standing as ‘natural signs’ for their normal causes.
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On that view, both colour perceptions and colour beliefs normally correspond with
reality, in the simple sense of being true. Still, the view retains a strong case to be
regarded a form of anti-realism. This has nothing to do with a failure of correspondence
in the sense of plain truth; nor is it to be characterized as a failure of any other  kind of
‘correspondence’. It is rather to be brought out by means of a contrast in directions of
explanation with respect to the individuation of perceptions of colour and the colours of
things. Compare the case of shapes. The most basic distinctions are between squareness
and circularity, say, as properties of things in the world, Having first identified which
property squareness is, we may then identify perceptions of squareness as those which
present something as having that property. On the current view concerning colour, the
direction of explanation is the reverse. The most basic distinctions are between
experiences of redness and experiences of greenness, say, conceived as blank sensations.
Having made such distinctions, we may then define a property – redness – which applies
to mind-independent objects, as that of being disposed to produce those experiences –
red-type ones – or  as the property of having whatever physical constitution actually
grounds that disposition. Thus, although, the colours are perfectly real, in the sense that
representations of objects as coloured, both in perception and belief, are frequently plain
true,they are nevertheless essentially mind-dependent. They are individuated by relation
                                                
1 See Ayers (1991, Pt. I, esp. ch. 7), for discussion of this idea, both in Locke, and in its
own right.4
to colour experiences, whose own individuation is explanatorily basic. In this sense,
colours are not features of the world as it is anyway, independent of experiential
perspective upon it.
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So, in the sense in which the realism/anti-realism debate is to be characterized by
appeal to a notion of correspondence between colour perceptions/beliefs and reality, this
is nothing other than the notion of plain truth. In the sense in which this notion is not to
the point, no more puzzling notion of correspondence is relevant either. The debate is
rather to be identified by means of a contrast in directions of explanation with respect to
the individuation of perceptions of colour and the colours of things.
Stroud’s central argument against the umasker of colours is rich and complex.
The unmasker aims to provide a complete explanation of all of our colour experiences
and beliefs on the assumption that the world as it is in itself contains no coloured objects,
and therefore to conclude that nothing we take to give us reason to believe that things are
really coloured does any such thing; so parsimony demands an anti-realist stance.
Stroud’s scepticism revolves around two questions. First, what is presupposed by the
unmasker’s acknowledgement of the existence of the full range of colour experiences and
beliefs? Second, what is required by her provision of a satisfactory explanation of their
occurrence? An initial premise of the argument is that these explananda cannot be
identified in purely physical terms, in part because it is unclear how properly to delineate
                                                
2 I do not wish to endorse the current account, but rather to bring out the way in which a
form of anti-realism about colours may be characterized by appeal to this contrast in
directions of individuative explanation.5
physical terms, but also because, on any plausible such delineation, physical terms are not
upto the job. I accept this premise for the sake of the subsequent argument, although it
may be thought to rest upon an overly demanding conception of what is involved in a
purely physical identification of the relevant psychological explananda. Let us accept that
full semantic reduction is not possible. The physicalist must claim instead that the facts of
colour perception and belief obtain in virtue of the obtaining of certain purely physical
facts. Stroud objects that only ground for this claim is a prior argument for exhaustive
physicalism, and in any case, the notion of one set of facts obtaining in virtue of another
is obscure. It is true that if the physicalism for which prior argument is required concerns,
not just psychological facts, but also facts about the colours of objects, then this would
render the unmasking strategy otiose. There are arguments for physicalism with respect
to folk psychology alone, though; and, even if none so far proposed is fully satisfactory,
there are also relatively well worked out attempts to explicate the ‘in virtue of’ claim
which such physicalism endorses. So perhaps the initial prenise should be taken as a
challenge to the unmasker, rather than a thesis which she must accept.
Stroud’s next step is to argue that no satisfactory explanation of colour
perceptions and beliefs can be given in purely physical terms. He assumes that any such
explanation must make it intelligible why the cited physical explanans produces precisely
the psychological explanandum which it does, in the sense that it must be possible a
priori to see why just that colour experience or belief - the experience of redness, say - is
produced by the particular physical events and process purportedly explanatory of it. This
is the intelligibility which Locke insists upon, for example, in the smith’s appreciation,6
without trial or experiment, that “the turning of one Key will open a Lock, and not the
turning of another” (1975, IV.iii.25). Given Stroud’s initial premise, that the relevant
psychological explanandum cannot be identified in purely physical terms, he rightly
claims that this condition cannot be met by any purely physical explanans. Why must the
unmasker accept the intelligibility condition, though? Hume regards all causal
explanations as brute and unintelligible in this sense (1975, VII, and 1978, I.iii). It is only
the habits of mind induced by repeated exposure to the relevant successions which give
us some feeling of appropriateness or necessity in the relation between cause and effect,
which are, in our basic conceptions of them entirely independent events without any a
priori connection at all. So Stroud’s case would be significantly strengthened by some
principled reason to reject this Humean account of explanations of colour perceptions and
belief.
The dialectic here is extremely delicate. For the intelligibility condition, applied
to the explanation of colour experiences, is plausibly equivalent to the denial of the
unmasker’s principal thesis: surely the only way to meet it is by characterizing
perceptions of colour as certain relations to specific colour properties of worldly things,
experiences of redness, say, being those which present something as being just that way,
namely red. This is to model the relation between perceptions of colour and the colours of
things on that I sketched earlier in connection with shapes; and it really does provide a
genuine intelligibility, just as it is plain to see why square things should produce
experiences of squareness, say. The approach is anathama to the unmasker, though. For it
assumes, in its characterization of colour perceptions, the possibility of reference to7
colours as properties of worldly objects. Conversely, one might formulate the second
form of anti-realism canvassed above as the thesis that, in contrast with the case of
shapes, there is no intelligible connection between the physical constitution of coloured
things and the colour perceptions which they produce. So Stroud cannot simply assume
that the intelligibility condition applies here, and any positive argument for its application
may render his criticism of the unmasking unnecessary, by providing a direct argument
for realism.
Let us return to Stroud’s first question about unmasking: what is presupposed by
the acknowledgement of the existence of colour experiences and beliefs? Focus on colour
perceptions. According to the initial premise, these may not be identified in purely
physical terms; and, on pain of self-defeat, they may not be identified by reference to
colour properties of worldly things. Stroud divides the remaining options into two
categories: those on which perceptions of colour are thought of as simple sensations, with
no intrinsic representational properties; and those on which colour perceptions are
construed as intrinsically representational.
He argues that the sensational conception is objectionable for at least two reasons.
First, there is no satisfactory characterization of the similarities and differences between
colour sensations. That is to say, it is not possible to give an acceptable account of what
all and only red-type sensations, say, have in common. Second, the sensational
conception is incapable properly of capturing all the interrelations between different
kinds of colour perception, or between perceptions of colour and colour beliefs. For the8
sake of what follows, I shall go along with this, although there are points which may be
made against each of his objections. The first rests on an assumption that it must be
possible to give a substantive account of what it is in virtue of which all the members of a
given kind belong together as members of that kind, other than simply that they are all of
that kind: red-type sensations, in this case. Why must we accept this? His second
objection certainly constitutes a challenge, but, as it stands, falls short of any argument
that this cannot be met.
Against the second, representational, conception of colour experiences, Stroud
argues along the following lines that this commits its proponent to beliefs about the
colours of mind-independent objects which are inconsistent with the conclusion of the
unmasking strategy. Perceptions are supposed to be characterized in terms of the ways
which they represent the world as being. The range of such ways of representing the
world which make sense, and are therefore available for the characterization of
perceptions, is constrained by the theorist’s own conception of the way the world is, by
his beliefs about how things are out there. Thus, he is capable of acknowledging the
existence of his own and others’ colour experiences only if he actually believes that
things in the world have the properties which they represent, namely colours. So the
unmasker’s recognition of the existence of colour perceptions rules out his rationally
arriving at the desired conclusion that these are best to be explained on the assumption
that nothing in the world is really coloured. The unmasking strategy is therefore self-
defeating: it is not possible coherently to combine belief in the existence of its
acknowledged explananda with belief in the truth of its conclusion. This does not, in9
Stroud’s view, entail the positive conclusion that colours as presented in perception are
genuine properties of worldly things. Rather, it forces us to recognize that one strategy
for arguing that colours are not features of the world is unsuccessful.
This argument strikes me as unstable. Either the dependence of the individuation
of colour perceptions upon the idea of specific properties of worldly things is perfectly
compatible with the unmasker’s overall strategy, or it actually entails a positive result for
the realist in the quest for reality: colour properties as presented in experience are genuine
features of mind-independent things.
Stroud’s distinction between sensational and representational conceptions of
colour perceptions corresponds, in my view, to that explicated above between the
secondary and primary quality models. Indeed, I think that this is the clearest way to
articulate the basic contrast between experiences as mind-dependent objects of
awareness, which may or may not be endowed with extrinsic representational properties,
and experiences as mind-dependent awarenesses of potentially mind-independent objects,
intrinsically representational of such things, and only to be identified as the mental
phenomena which they are as such. On the sensational account, then, distinctions
between red-type and green-type colour experiences, and so on, are basic, and made
entirely independently of any consideration of what the worldly correlates of such
experiences may be. This is what it is for colour perceptions to be intrinsically non-
representational mental objects. The whole point of the representational approach, on the
other hand, is to characterize perceptions of colour in terms of the properties which they10
intrinsically represent things as having, which worldly colour properties must therefore
be individuatively basic, redness being distinguished from greenness, say, without any
essential reference to the colour experiences which such properties normally produce. On
this view, it is only possible to say which mental occurrence a given colour perception is
by mentioning a specific such colour property which it represents. So there is, as Stroud
insists, a dependence of the identification of perceptions of colour upon some
identification of colour properties themselves.
Now, I can see just two ways in which this dependence may work. First, the
theorist’s identification of colour perceptions depends upon her possession of some more-
or-less coherent conception of what it would be for things in the world to be the colours
such perceptions present them as being. No doubt this conception derives in the first
instance from her own possession of the colour perceptions in question, which no doubt
also give rise to her own pretheoretical beliefs that some things at least in the world are
just those ways. Still, her possession of the conception itself is quite independent of
whether anything in the world actually is, or is even believed by her to be, any such way.
Thus it is perfectly possible for her to retain her conception of what it would be for things
in the world to be coloured, even after her discovery of an unmasking explanation of the
production of her and others’ colour perceptions and beliefs, which in turn requires the
rejection of her own and others’ pretheoretical beliefs that things in the world actually are
coloured. She retains sufficient understanding of what it would be for them to be so to
identify her own and others’ perceptions which present them as being so, but has an
explanation of the production in her and others of those perceptions which leads her to11
the conclusion that nothing in the world actually is like that at all: all colour perceptions
and beliefs are in fact false. On this construal of the dependence, there is, so far as I can
see, no difficulty of principle in carrying out the unmasking strategy.
Second, the dependence of the identification of perceptions of colour upon the
identification of colour properties themselves may consist in the fact that colour
perceptions are essentially individuated as the subject’s responses to particular properties
of things in the world. Thus, the theorist’s identification of her own and others’ colour
perceptions depends upon her successful reference to those very properties which things
out there actually have. If this is the way the dependence works, then the unmasker’s
project is clearly hopeless. This is not because her identification of the relevant
explananda requires her belief that her own desired conclusion is false, as Stroud
suggests, in such a way that no conclusive result can be reached either way in connection
with the quest for reality itself. The claim that things are really coloured remains, in his
view, as it was to begin with: except perhaps in moments of peculiar philosophical
reflection, we all believe that it is true; but nothing whatsoever has been done to give it
any kind of transcendental proof or refutation. Rather, my second construal of the
dependence actually entails a positive result for the realist in connection with the
fundamental quest. It is a datum that we have perceptions of colour at least. These can
only be identified as the particular mental phenomena which they are by making
successful reference to the colour properties of things in the non-mental world:
perceptions of colour are essentially relations between perceiving subjects and the colour
properties of the objects in the world around them. Thus, things in the world really are12
coloured. Many of our colour perceptions and beliefs are plain true, and commonsense
realism about colour is vindicated.
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